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For the Doha negotiations, the World Trade Organization’s view is that the developed 
countries will lose agriculture after abolishing protectionism, and thus need the developing 
countries to open industry/services market largely as a compensation. But the developed countries 
cannot afford to lose agriculture as the most strategic lifeline, and the developing (including 
African) countries cannot afford to open industry/services market largely since it is weak in front of 
the developed countries. This is the key reason why the Doha negotiations have been blocked.
Ever since the 1950s, after the first land reform of distributing land ownership (or possession 
under public ownership) to small farmers, the irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied 
part-time and absent small farmers earning higher off-farm income but unwilling to lease the under-
producing land beyond their family consumption need to full-time farmers, has been a global 
obstacle (including Africa), even if land property rights have been well defined and sale/lease 
allowed. [Polyopoly denotes the control of a resource by many sellers in contrast to monopoly (by 
one seller) and oligopoly (by a few sellers)]. This is mainly due to low rents, avoidance of misuse 
by tenants, jealousy in preventing neighbors from prospering, and hobby use. In those countries 
where this land reform has not been completed, there are also large landowners who exercise it. The 
full-time farmers, without right to use such under-utilized or idled land, have to subsist on tiny 
farms, cut forests for more land, or quit agriculture for cities or developed countries. The land of the 
emigrants is ineffectively used by their old parents, wives or children, or just idled. Numerous 
developing nations have to import food, while many industrialized nations have given huge 
subsidies to maintain farmers on agriculture, causing overproduction.
In the USA, (1) there is a time effect on turning occupied private property into ownership - 
adverse possession, which means that if a private person has occupied a private property without 
agreement of the owner, while the owner has not sued him during a limited period, then this 
property will belong to him. (2) There is a ‘squatters' rights’ law for turning occupied public land 
into private ownership, which denotes that if a person has occupied a public land for over 20 years 
and paid taxes, the Secretary of the Interior may issue a patent for 160 acres of such land upon the 
payment of not less than 1.25 dollars per acre. These laws are still exercised. Their main 
significance is to encourage the efficient use of the idled private and public land. Their main 
imperfections are that (1) If a private landowner has found that his land is being used by another 
without his agreement within the limitations period, he may sue to get the land back, still idling it. 
(2) After an adverse possessor or squatter has gained ownership of a private or public land, he may 
idle or under-utilize it. (3) People may not wish to lose private land even if they do not use it. In 
Western Europe, (1) there has been a law to give right to other farmers to produce sufficiently on 
any under-producing land (i.e., less than 40% of the normal output): in the EU Council Regulations 
1963/262,  1967/531 and 1963/261; Italy 4 August 1978 (still valid  but not applied);  and 
Switzerland from the Middle Ages that any farmer can bring his cattle to graze in the private 
pastures of the Alps (still valid but not applied). Its main shortcoming is that it obliges landowners 
to lease out all their inefficiently used land, so that part-time and absent landowners could not 
produce for family consumption and keep farming skills; and once lost off-farm jobs, would either 
have no access to their land rented out, or have to withdraw it within the contractual period, 
affecting the lessees. (2) There has also been a law to oblige landowners to either use their land or 
lease it out for sufficient production: in Germany 31 March 1915 (until 1961); the UK 6 August 
1-31947; Norway 18 March 1955, 25 June 1965, and 31 May 1974 (still applied due to continuing 
under-self-sufficiency with the cold weather), and Denmark 17 July 1989. Its main shortcomings 
are that it may cause overproduction, and the above-mentioned one. Both laws have been suspended 
at the overproduction stage.
Improving them, and consistent with the ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU’, 
‘Article 17 Right to Property’, ‘The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is 
necessary for the general interest', the author has raised Proposal (I) Give full-time farmers access 
to the under-producing land beyond family consumption need of the part-time and absent farmers. 
A landowner may keep a part of his land as land for family consumption (without relying on buying 
food in the market, for practicing farming skills, and returning to agriculture once lost off-farm 
jobs) even if he does not produce sufficiently on it (the criterion for sufficient production may be 
different from 40% of the normal output). The rest of the land is land for market. If nobody would 
like to lease it in, the owner may keep it even without sufficient production, so that overproduction 
could be prevented. But if other farmers, without being forced by any one, merely out of their 
economic considerations, would like to lease it in, the owner could not refuse even at low rents, so 
that the irrational production abandonment could also be avoided. Once the leasing contract is over, 
the owner has the right to withdraw the land. But if he does not produce sufficiently on it for one 
year, while other farmers wish to lease it in for so doing, he could not decline. If afforded, the state 
may provide a basic welfare to every rural (and urban) resident who would have to compete in the 
market to earn more; and a decoupled direct subsidy to the real land operator. The state should set 
up a ceiling of chemical fertilizer, pesticide and herbicide per ha and inspect its application so as to 
protect the interests of the landowners and promote green products.
Proposal (II) Convert the environmentally sensitive land back to the nature permanently 
once a country has encountered constant overproduction. Some developed countries have regarded 
the highly productive land as the cause for overproduction and set aside a part of it from cereal 
production on a quasi-compulsory basis, while setting aside the lowly productive land on a 
voluntary basis. The EU stopped set-aside in the autumn 2007 to raise production, without giving 
alternative to the better environment it had brought. But the author finds that the true cause is 
protectionism without which farmers would have no incentive to overproduce even if highly 
productive land is available. Thus such countries should phase out protectionism, and make the non-
environmentally sensitive land (both highly and lowly productive) available for full-time farmers, 
while   converting   the   environmentally   sensitive   land   (both   highly   and   lowly   productive) 
permanently back to the nature (forests, lake land, grass land and wet land). Its landowners should 
not   produce   cereals,   but   could   pursue   production   of   fruits,   vegetables,   livestock,   fishery, 
afforestation, processing of agricultural products, transportation, rural tourism, etc. They could be 
paid a transitional subsidy until earning a basic living by non-cereal production activities.
They would, without affecting private land ownership, simultaneously reach eight aims: (1) 
minimize/abolish/prevent protectionism, while (2) avoiding overproduction and (3) irrational 
production abandonment; (4) boost competitive full-time large farmers, whereas (5) not crowding 
part-time and absent small farmers out of agriculture; (6) reach/maintain basic self-sufficiency in 
cereals, meanwhile (7) promoting multi-functionality of other agricultural and rural sectors and (8) 
improving the environment. They would be useful also for public land ownership. Hence launching 
a second global land reform – land use reform.
New Zealand, Australia, the USA and Canada would not need to worry about losing basic 
self-sufficiency in cereals because the earlier immigrants had formed the largest farms of the world 
with very low costs which could easily feed their small population. Thus protectionism is generally 
not implemented in New Zealand and Australia. Its root in the USA and Canada is political as 
farmers want more income and politicians need more votes. Thus they could also abolish 
protectionism without losing basic self-sufficiency in cereals. Only after their population has grown 
to the extent of threatening food basic self-sufficiency, would Proposal (I) need to be applied. All 
the other nations do worry about this economic, political and strategic problem. Thus Proposal (I) 
2-3could be applied right now to prevent protectionism without losing food basic self-sufficiency. 
Proposal (II) would be relevant to all countries. Only by adopting them, will the developed 
countries not lose agriculture, thus having no need to demand the developing countries to open 
industry/services market largely, hence a breakthrough in the Doha negotiations would be possible.
Unfortunately, land tenure and these Proposals have been long neglected in the Doha 
negotiations. It is now imperative to raise them into the agenda.
Comments
WTO Diretor-General Lamy's View on Doha Negotiations
1 Thursday, 01 April 2010
Elisa Gesti
(http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl116_e.htm)
'25 February 2009 Lamy underscores Doha Round benefits for Japan'
'Japan will face pressure from other WTO members to further open its agricultural market 
and to accept new disciplines for fishery subsidies. I understand this is a difficult decision at home 
and that it will take some time. But I just want to assure you that this happens everywhere. It is not 
easier for the US or European Union to reduce its agricultural subsidies or for the Chinese 
government to reduce its industrial tariffs further. Multilateral trade negotiations are a GIVE and 
TAKE, no country can ever get everything it wants, and no country will LOSE everything without 
RETURNS.'
Doha negotiations framework and 80% agreements achieved would not be affected
3 Wednesday, 07 April 2010
Jian-Ming Zhou
Adding this topic would not abolish the current framework of the Doha negotiations, nor the 
80% agreements achieved.
Reasonable minimun protection after rational and competitive land use
4 Saturday, 10 April 2010
Jian-Ming Zhou
Once a country (such as Japan, South Korea, Switzerland) has rationally and competitively 
used all its cultivable land by adopting these Proposals, but its costs were still higher than in the 
other countries, it could be allowed to implement a minimum protection so as to keep a certain 
degree of self-sufficiency of the main cereal (rice for Asia and wheat for Europe), because there are 
still wars and threats in the world. The amount of this degree could be discussed in the Doha 
negotiations. For example, the free trade zone started in January 2010 between the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations and China will reduce only 50% of the rice tariff by 2015. Norway has 
efficiently and competitively used all its cultivable land by applying the above-cited laws which are 
very harsh in comparison with the more lenient Proposal (I), but its costs are still higher than in the 
other countries due to the cold weather, its protection to keep a certain degree of self-sufficiency of 
the main cereal would be regarded as minimum and understandable (otherwise it would lose 
agriculture completely). In contrast, if there is irrational land use, it would be unreasonable for the 
country to exercise protectionism (this situation is very serious in Japan and South Korea).
*********************************************** 
For   the   earlier   responses   to   these   Proposals,   see   the   author's   fifth   FAO   publication 
(http://www.icarrd.org/en/proposals/Zhou.pdf) pp. 7-57.
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